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# The Curious Case of the Mis-claimed Myth Claims: Ethnic Segregation, Polarisation and the Future of Bradford

Alan Carling

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## Abstract

The claims made by a number of authors about the mythical status of ethnic residential segregation in the Bradford District are shown to be untenable. There is clear evidence of segregation, self-segregation and increasing levels of segregation in the Bradford context. These social patterns give rise to concerns about the possibility of cultural and political polarisation, and accompanying social conflict, between population groups with differing racial, ethnic and religious backgrounds. An open and inclusive dialogue about a shared future would help to avoid any danger of this possibility materialising.

The District of Bradford in West Yorkshire, UK,<sup>1</sup> stands out as a locus of enquiry into contemporary issues of racial and ethnic division for a number of reasons

- It is a large conurbation, the fifth-largest in England, with a population close to half a million.
- By comparison with most other urban centres in the UK, it has a large Black and Ethnic Minority (BEM) population, both in absolute and relative terms. Demographic trends suggest that this population is likely to grow from its current level of about 20 per cent of the total to 30 per cent or above within the foreseeable future.
- This population has a specific ethnic and religious formation, in that a large majority of the Black and Ethnic Minority (up to 80 per cent) is composed of individuals of Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage and Muslim faith background, whose family origins often lie in particular localities of the Indian sub-continent. This has led one authority to describe Bradford as “Britain’s ‘Islamabad’” (Lewis, 2002, p. 49).
- The influential Ouseley Report (Ouseley, 2001) on the social situation in Bradford, raised issues of ethnic and racial segregation and ‘self-segregation’ in the Bradford District and spoke of the ‘parallel lives’ lived by citizens of Bradford with different

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- racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds. Subsequent writings have echoed this concern (Cantle, 2001; Bühler *et al.*, 2002; Denham, 2002; Vine, 2004; Carling 2007).
- There is a recent history of violent communal disturbances, including the riots of 7 July 2001, which were the most serious outbreak of public disorder in mainland Britain for over 20 years. There has also been a more recent rise in electoral support for political parties of the far right. Four candidates of the British National Party (BNP) were elected in the local government elections of 2004 and more votes were cast for the BNP in the elections of 2006 and 2007 than in 2004, although the number of BNP councillors declined.

In the post-9/11 world, these circumstances combine to make Bradford look like one of the fault lines in a supposed global confrontation between 'Islam' and 'the West'. At all events, the scale and the nature of the challenges faced by the District make it one of the key places in the UK, and possibly in Europe as a whole, in which the relationships between populations of Muslim and non-Muslim background in the West are likely to be worked out in the future, either for good or for ill.

For many people familiar with the Bradford District, the publication of the Ouseley Report came as a breath of fresh air, because it was (almost) the first time that issues of everyday concern about the development of communal relationships had been broached in public from a source whose authority made it difficult to ignore.<sup>2</sup> The findings of the Report were not well-received by everyone, however. In particular, the hypotheses of segregation and self-segregation have proved controversial. The demographer Ludi Simpson (2004) has gone so far as to claim that, so far as Bradford is concerned, "self-segregation can now be seen to be a myth" (p. 677) and "increasing residential segregation of South Asian communities is a myth" (p. 668). The terminology of 'myth'

has been taken up by other commentators (Phillips, 2006, p. 31; Alam and Husband, 2006, p. 14).

I will begin this paper by clarifying the usage of the key terms 'segregation' and 'self-segregation', before submitting Simpson's two central myth-claims to critical scrutiny in the light of the evidence he presents, and from other sources. The conclusion will be that these myth-claims are mis-claimed. Neither segregation, nor self-segregation, nor increasing levels of segregation is a mythical phenomenon in the Bradford context. I will then go on to consider the development of community relationships in Bradford more generally, moving the focus of attention from the social segregation of different population groups to the dangers of cultural and political polarisation between them.

## Segregation and Self-segregation

The first of Simpson's myth-claims says that: "self-segregation can now be seen to be a myth" (Simpson, 2004, p. 677) and thus refers to 'self-segregation'. The second says that the "increasing residential segregation of South Asian communities is a myth" (Simpson, 2004, p. 668) and refers instead to 'segregation'.

It is essential to keep in mind the distinction between these two concepts. The usage of the term 'segregation' within this debate makes clear that it is a *statistical* concept, concerned with the uneven distribution of a variable. According to this conception, a population is segregated (in relation to a particular variable such as ethnicity, nationality, gender, etc.) if there is a tendency for members of one or more categories of the population (as defined by the variable) to be represented disproportionately in particular areas of residence, on the rolls of particular schools and so on.<sup>3</sup> Thus the English and the Dutch are segregated residentially if they tend to live in different European countries, for example, England and Holland.

Self-segregation refers by contrast to a more-or-less self-conscious *social process* through which patterns of observed segregation may or may not come about, part of the process perhaps by which the English have come to live disproportionately in England and the Dutch disproportionately in Holland. Any analysis into an alleged process of self-segregation evidently needs to begin from a clear definition of what 'self-segregation' is. Simpson says in his original paper that "self-segregation refers to individuals' residential choice" and that "self-segregation ... is a dynamic process", which "implies an increase in segregation over time" (Simpson, 2004, pp. 668, 665). In a later paper (Simpson, 2005a, p. 1229), he says that "'self-segregation' and 'isolationism'... describe movement towards one's own and away from others; they describe a process". These remarks suggest that Simpson regards self-segregation as a choice process informed by group awareness (for example, of 'one's own' group or 'others'). It can be said more formally that self-segregation is a choice made by any member of a given group which reflects a preference to associate with another member (or members) of the group in virtue of shared group membership.

Much of the difficulty in the debate about residential segregation derives from the fact that conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis of segregation—especially the level and movement over time of various numerical *indices* of segregation—are used to infer conclusions about a quite different phenomenon—namely, self-segregation.<sup>4</sup> Given that the exercise is aimed ultimately towards policy matters, the factual issue of whether or not self-segregation exists gives rise quickly to two further questions: first, whether or not self-segregation (as defined) is a good thing or a bad thing; and, secondly, to the extent that it is deemed a bad thing, what steps might be taken (by the public authorities or other agencies) to alleviate it.

As defined earlier, self-segregation is a ubiquitous feature of social life and it can hardly be a bad thing, taken in its entirety. No committee meeting, sporting contest or family gathering could take place without self-segregation. So the question becomes: *under what circumstances* is it a bad thing?

Although it is not easy to give a complete answer to this question, it is at least clear that a satisfactory answer must reconcile two sets of competing considerations. On the one hand, the people of the Bradford District, say, are fully entitled to make life-choices about residence, education, religion, work, leisure activity and so on, without being interrogated too closely about their reasons for making those choices. And there would seem to be no justification for singling out the ethnically-diverse populations of places like Bradford for special scrutiny in this respect, as opposed to the predominantly White residents of much of suburban and provincial Britain. Yet these patterns of choice may yield segregated outcomes, in Bradford or elsewhere. As Simpson himself notes, in relation to the historical experience of immigrants to Bradford

Mutual support between those with similar language, cultural and religious traditions, which are not well served by indigenous religious and secular networks, led naturally to very local concentrations (Simpson, 2004, p. 662).

The clear implication is that these forms of self-segregation are understandable ('natural') and are presumably therefore no bad thing.

On the other hand, self-segregation along racial or ethnic lines can become problematic under two broad sets of circumstances, concerned respectively with the problematic *motives* lying behind the choices and the problematic *effects* of the choices, whether or not the relevant choices are also motivated in problematic ways. The most salient of the

problematic motives are racist motives—that is, choices motivated by antagonism towards other groups defined by race or ethnicity.<sup>5</sup> The problematic effects include the reduction of regular contacts between members of different ethnic groups, a narrowing of social horizons and personal experience, the erosion of trust and understanding, and the creation of conditions that may give rise to unproductive social conflict.

There is plenty of room for argument about the exact nature and scope of the concerns raised by self-segregation under these two broad headings. The important point for the present is to note that, even where self-segregation is shown to exist, it generates concern only in the kind of cases listed earlier—call them the undesirable cases—but not in all cases. The corresponding issue for both research and policy is whether these undesirable forms of self-segregation are a major feature of life in Bradford. Simpson is confident that they are not, from which it follows that nothing needs to be done on the policy front to alleviate (these undesirable varieties of) self-segregation. Or rather, what needs to be done is at most an exercise in ‘myth-busting’, to overcome the widespread, and in his view erroneous, perception that self-segregation is happening in Bradford. And his paper is implicitly self-conceived as a contribution to this honourable effort (Simpson, 2004, pp. 664, 679).

### The Statistician as Myth-buster

It is worth emphasising that Simpson conceives this intervention in heroic mode, as a political struggle for the correct position, rather than (or in addition to) a technical struggle with recalcitrant numerical data. He writes for example in a paper entitled “‘Race’ statistics: their’s and our’s” that

*Statistical myth busting* is putting [*sic*] legends under the magnifying glass of a statistical

review. For example, current legends about self-segregation (usually pejoratively against Muslims and sympathetically about Whites as in ‘White flight’) are passed from official inquiry to official inquiry, from news item to news item, and from government minister’s mouth to all who are unquestioning enough to pass them on. Such legends are based on assumptions that can be tested with demographic data and laid to rest or amended with greater confidence about what represents truth (Simpson, 2005b, pp. 14–15; original emphasis).

This formulation suggests that the demon (or is it the ghost?) that must be ‘laid to rest’ is a compound of both White prejudice and statistical untruth, whereby the disclosure of statistical truth will simultaneously strike a blow against prejudice. And the title of the paper envisages a sharp distinction between ‘us’, who are presumably those with the correct values intent on searching out the truth, and ‘them’, who seem to be either venal themselves or merely unwitting dupes “unquestioning enough to pass ... on” the statistical legends that are destined to meet their well-deserved nemesis at the hands of the myth-buster.

The closing words of his initial paper on segregation in Bradford are similarly explicit about the political purposes of statistical analysis

Through racially conscious language and research directed at myth-busting and highlighting discrimination both individual and institutional, investigators play a part in making a just society in which racial differences no longer identify cumulative discrimination but one aspect of social description [*sic*] (Simpson, 2004, p. 679).

And so is the statement made earlier in the paper that the statistics of racial demography

should be used to understand and combat racial injustices and the racial thinking that informs some social policy (Simpson, 2004, p. 664).

It is evident that Simpson intends this politicisation of statistical practice to extend quite far into the techniques of both investigation and measurement that it is permissible for the statistician to apply. He takes this insistence to hazardous lengths in some cases,<sup>6</sup> but luckily he does not go all the way. Simpson is no relativist. He is not arguing in post-modern vein that all narratives deserve equal credence, or that the truth or otherwise of various statistical propositions is determined in part by their political acceptability. Indeed, his projected role as a myth-buster depends on the ability to distinguish between true statements and false ('mythical') ones, as the earlier quotations make clear: the aim is to achieve "greater confidence about what represents truth". We may therefore proceed on common philosophical ground to assess the truth value of his myth-claims.

### The Problem of Self-segregation

The main problem about any claim concerning self-segregation in Bradford is that the information is not available that would be necessary to resolve the empirical issue one way or the other. And it is certain that aggregate statistical analysis, on which Simpson chiefly relies, could never supply the answer by itself.

To see this, consider what would be necessary to establish a claim of self-segregation. First, one would need to distinguish self-segregation from other social mechanisms leading to the observed patterns of (statistical) segregation.<sup>7</sup> For example, a family might be motivated to sell a house in a certain area by the expectation of financial gain, or to move to a house somewhere else with a larger yard, or a better view. Self-segregation (as defined earlier) is only involved if the family is motivated instead to move by its desire to be surrounded by families of a similar type, or perhaps to avoid being surrounded by

families of a different type. And this process of social marking might involve a variety of different social descriptions, in terms of social class, say, or respectability, rather than race, ethnicity or religion. Each of these different forms of description gives rise to a different potential variant of self-segregation, so that 'White flight', for example, would need to be distinguished from 'middle-class flight'. And it is quite possible that the evaluation of the phenomenon will vary according to the description given, so that some forms of self-segregation are thought to be of greater concern than others.

The issue is further complicated by the fact that families (or of course individuals) may have mixed motivations, some of which might be aspirational, say, and some segregational. Yet even if this methodological hurdle were cleared, it would be necessary to distinguish for the purposes of policy between ideologically acceptable and ideologically unacceptable exemplars of each different type of self-segregation, given the common-sense view, implicitly endorsed by Simpson in his comment on the immigrant experience, that some varieties of self-segregation, even on racial, ethnic or religious grounds, may be acceptable.

Since Simpson supplies neither the conceptual argument concerning segregation processes nor the data on the micro-foundations of behaviour that would allow him in principle to answer these questions, he is in no position to claim that "the legend of self-segregation can now be seen to be a myth" (2004, p. 677). This flaw is a fundamental one. Simpson is claiming to know things about what is or is not happening in Bradford that he is not in a position to know, at least on the evidence presented in his several contributions on the subject. In fact, he is promulgating his own version of an urban myth—namely, that self-segregation is a mythical process. And this urban myth reaches beyond the academy too, because of the way in which his view has been

quoted or implied in the national debates on the issue of segregation in the wake of the London bombings of 7 July 2005.<sup>8</sup>

The proper resolution of these questions would require a more elaborate research design, in which the macro approach of aggregate statistical analysis was married with special micro studies designed to elucidate behavioural motivations and effects. In the remainder of this paper, I will ask what can be inferred nevertheless from the data that are available, granted that none of the participants in the debate has the information that would be required to resolve some of the issues of greatest interest.

### Residential Segregation in the Bradford District, 1991–2001

Simpson summarises his data as shown in Table 1. He remarks that “for this paper’s context, the ‘Other’ group can usually be safely interpreted as ‘White’” (2004, p. 669). I will follow Simpson in this respect and speak of ‘Others’ as ‘White’ when considering the implications of these data. This is because I am interested in seeing whether the conclusions he draws are warranted in the light of his

own evidence, granted all the assumptions that have gone into the construction of his datasets. It is worth noting, however, that this reduction of the ethnic complexity of Bradford’s population to a binary distinction between ‘South Asians’ and ‘Whites’ rides roughshod over a number of differences, especially religious differences, that are important to the current situation in the District. I will return later to this theme.

The data presented in Table 1 chart two kinds of change in the ethnic distribution of the population during the decade. The first type of population change, on which Simpson focuses his commentary, is the decline in the number of census enumeration districts (EDs) with exclusively White populations, from 617 in 1991 to 593 in 1996 and then 553 in 2001. This no doubt reflects a process in which some South Asian Bradfordians are dispersing out of the inner-city areas towards the previously all-White suburbs. A factor in this movement may be the increasing affluence of some South Asian families, who are thus participating in a general outward population movement of ‘middle-class flight’.

It is Simpson’s treatment of the second type of population change that is, however,

**Table 1.** The ethnic composition of the Bradford District: census enumeration districts (EDs), 1991–2001

	<i>Exclusively South Asian</i>	<i>Predominantly South Asian</i>	<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Predominantly other</i>	<i>Exclusively other</i>
1991	0	29	152	129	617
1996	1	43	154	136	593
2001	0	77	163	134	553

*Notes:* These data record the ethnic composition of the 927 census enumeration districts (EDs) in Bradford, as between South Asian residents and ‘Other’ residents, the latter including all those not classified as South Asian. Each ED represents a mini-neighbourhood containing 150–200 households averaging just over 500 individuals. ‘Exclusively South Asian’ EDs contain more than 95 per cent from South Asian ethnic groups; ‘Predominantly South Asian’ contain between 75 per cent and 95 per cent; ‘Mixed’ EDs contain between 75 per cent and 25 per cent of each of the two groups; ‘Predominantly Other’ EDs contain between 75 per cent and 95 per cent Other residents; and ‘Exclusively Other’ EDs more than 95 per cent Other.

*Source:* Simpson (2004, Table 2).

problematic. He points out that there are fewer 'mono-racial' areas in Bradford, because there are hardly any areas that are exclusively Asian (none in 1991 and 2001, and just one in 1996) and there are, as we have seen, fewer that are exclusively White (Simpson, 2004, p. 669). So it is true that the number of mono-racial areas has declined, but the emphasis on this point provides a tendentious interpretation of Table 1, because it overlooks the second column of the table, where salient action also occurs.

The second column records the fact that the number of *predominantly* South Asian EDs has increased very sharply over the decade. In fact, the frequency has more than doubled, from 29 to 77. Although this change has affected a relatively small total of EDs, the population numbers are by no means insignificant. In 1991, some 14 652 South Asian Bradfordians were living in predominantly South Asian EDs.<sup>9</sup> Ten years later, the number had risen to 39 659. Interestingly, the amount of the increase (25 007) is not far short of the *total* increase in the South Asian population over the decade, from the combined effects of net inward migration and natural increase (28 702).<sup>10</sup> It is as if the experience of Bradford for its 'new' South Asian population has been an experience of highly segregated residence *for almost 9 out of 10 of this new cohort*, who have ended up living in immediate neighbourhoods that are 75–95 per cent South Asian. The next section considers the reasons for this change.

### Why Has the Number of Predominantly South Asian EDs Increased?

This is a complicated issue and, like all the most interesting questions, the data required to answer it are not yet available. The factors emphasised by Simpson are undoubtedly important. The South Asian population is

younger on average than the population at large and this will lead to a higher rate of 'natural' increase regardless of what is happening to birth rates at the same time. It may be that the non-South-Asian populations remaining in predominantly South Asian areas are older than average, with higher death rates. And there will be non-South-Asians who are participating in the outward movement of rising affluence towards the suburbs, given that the predominantly South Asian EDs tend to be near the town centres of either the city of Bradford itself or Keighley.

As always, the principal segregation of urban residential space operates by means of social class through the various markets in different kinds of housing. As Simpson (2004, p. 668) observes, "much of the movement by all groups is dependent on the means to move rather than racially motivated—it is migration of the relatively affluent". It is a fair question why we should be so concerned by racial and ethnic segregation in this field, when we tend to take for granted the overarching reality of segregation by social class. And given the association between ethnicity and deprivation, any measure of residential segregation by ethnicity is likely to reflect by proxy substantial inequalities in class position by income and wealth.

Simpson is not to be criticised in my view for emphasising these factors, which must figure prominently in any balanced appraisal of the processes occurring in the District. Where I think criticism is warranted is the failure to give an appropriate weight to other factors, which point towards self-conscious self-segregation on racial or ethnic grounds.

He recognises in fact that

There is sufficient anecdotal evidence to say that many families describe their current and their preferred residential areas in racial terms as well as in terms of relative prosperity and may move (or not move) with both in mind (Simpson, 2004, p. 675).

This is to accept, in other words, that self-segregation exists in Bradford, although this awareness does not seem to disturb his headline conclusions. He also notes at one point that

three of the inner-city wards stand out as having lost between 20 per cent and 25 per cent of their White population through migration during the 1990s—the inner-city wards of Toller, Bradford Moor and Little Horton (Simpson, 2004, p. 674).

As I will argue later, it is doubtful that population changes of that order of magnitude over such a short period of time can be made consistent with a hypothesis of ethnically-neutral ‘middle-class flight’.

One of the few recent sources of direct evidence on self-segregation comes from studies by the geographer Deborah Phillips and her colleagues, based in part on interview data from South Asian household members.<sup>11</sup> Phillips *et al.* record for example that

Nearly all of the respondents interviewed as part of our household survey could identify areas of the city that they would avoid. Their perceptions strongly reflected a racialised view of residential space in Bradford, although class associations were also important to some (Phillips *et al.*, 2002, p. 10).

The authors add in conclusion that

Our research in Bradford indicates that clustering on the basis of ethnicity remains important, even for the younger generation of South Asians. It is sustained by positive community links, traditions and a sense of ethnic identity. It is also maintained by a fear of racial harassment and isolation (Phillips *et al.*, 2002, p. 10)

The first quotation says, in other words, that some level of ethnic marking of residential areas was prevalent among the respondents. And since “clustering on the basis of ethnicity” appears to be ‘self-segregation’ by another name, the conclusion indicates that self-segregation exists in Bradford. It is useful

to add the rider from this research that the preferences for remaining with members of the South Asian group among South Asian respondents (which is required to satisfy the definition earlier of self-segregation) derive from both positive factors—“community links, traditions and a sense of ethnic identity”—and negative factors, especially perceptions of external hostility.

This study records at the same time that the experience of segregation is *differentiated by ethnic background*, and especially by religion, among South Asian residents

There was also an increasing separation of the South Asian religious groups over the 1990s, as Sikhs and Hindus (Indians) continued to leave the inner city for the inner suburbs, such as Heaton.

Importantly, the name analysis data for the 1990s indicated that all South Asian religious groups have been making some progress in terms of access to better neighbourhoods in Bradford. Over a third of Sikhs (35 per cent), a quarter of Hindus (28 per cent) and 10 per cent of Muslims were living in reasonably well off suburban areas by 2000.

However, this movement of South Asians into new areas of Bradford is not random; it involves some residential clustering by religious group (Phillips *et al.*, 2002, p. 10).

This differentiation by religion within a common movement is quite striking. It shows the limitations of restricting the data to a binary partition between ‘South Asians’ and ‘Others’. “[R]esidential clustering by religious group” also introduces a new variety of self-segregation—namely, religious self-segregation.

The evidence of self-segregation reported by Phillips and her colleagues is thus substantial. This makes it puzzling that they remark in the same paper that “the charges of self-segregation [in Bradford] are not justified” (p. 9). How can this statement be reconciled with the evidence to the contrary that occurs alongside the very same statement?

A clue to resolving this discrepancy can perhaps be found in a related remark that “the idea of self-segregation implies that the Muslims of Bradford are choosing not to mix. Our research findings challenge this view” (Phillips *et al.*, 2002, p. 9). This point is further illuminated by a comment in a later report from the same research team that

One Pakistani mother in Bradford illustrated the feelings of many younger Muslim respondents when she said that she wanted her children to be brought up in a Muslim environment, but she wanted them to play with children from other religions as well (Phillips and Radcliffe, 2005, p. 4; and see Phillips, 2006, p. 36).

This mother’s expressed preference evidently envisages a *combined* social process, in which some choices are made in order to enter and/or to sustain “a Muslim environment” (for the sake of the children’s upbringing) and other choices are designed to broaden the children’s range of social contacts to include children of other faith groups. The first type of choice involves self-segregation according to the definition given earlier and the second type of choice does not. Expressed slightly differently, the first type of choice implies a self-conscious decision not to mix, whereas the second type of choice involves a self-conscious decision to mix.<sup>12</sup>

There is nothing incompatible in principle between these two types of choice. It is just that ‘self-segregating choices’ are made in some contexts or on some occasions, and ‘choices to mix’ are made in other contexts or on other occasions. So we may take Phillips’ research findings to show that the existence of self-segregation in some contexts does not imply the existence of self-segregation in all contexts—self-segregation is not to be confused with self-seclusion. When Phillips rejects the idea that “the Muslims of Bradford are choosing not to mix”, it therefore seems

plausible to interpret the rejection of this statement as the affirmation of a different statement—namely, that ‘the Muslims of Bradford are *not always* choosing not to mix’. This interpretation reconciles the apparent contradictions that gave rise to this discussion. Yet nothing in the discussion warrants the conclusion that self-segregation is a non-existent phenomenon in Bradford. All it says is that self-segregation is not a universal phenomenon.<sup>13</sup>

With this broad picture in mind—derived it should be emphasised from Simpson’s own data, or other sources on which he has relied—we can turn to the question of what is mythical and what is not about segregation in Bradford.

## What Myth?

*Chambers* dictionary defines a myth as “a commonly-held belief that is untrue, or without foundation”. The *Oxford English Dictionary* speaks of “a fictitious person or thing” or “a *purely* fictitious narrative” (emphasis added). A self-styled myth-buster who claims that some common perception is a myth is thus operating towards the higher end of the scale of conclusiveness. To claim of some phenomenon P that ‘P is mythical’ is to invite the judgement that belief in P is, say, comprehensively misconceived. It does not invite a judgement of more modest proportions, such that it is, for example, true in some circumstances but not in others.<sup>14</sup> And whether or nor a given myth-claim is valid depends of course on the identity of the phenomenon P that is claimed to be mythical.

Simpson’s two principal myth-claims have been quoted at the head of this article. It is convenient to list these again and to complete the family of possible myth-claims by listing two others with which they might be confused, as follows

*Myth-claim 1*: “self-segregation can now be seen to be a myth” (Simpson, 2004, p. 677).

*Myth-claim 2*: residential self-segregation can now be seen to be a myth.

*Myth-claim 3*: residential segregation can now be seen to be a myth.

*Myth-claim 4*: “Increasing residential segregation of South Asian communities is a myth” (Simpson, 2004, p. 668, emphasis added).

The first and fourth claims are the principal myth-claims cited *verbatim* from the text; the others are missing links, which connect the first and fourth claims by a sequence of easy steps, as follows. Myth-claim 1 speaks of self-segregation in general, whereas Myth-claim 2 deals only with its residential sub-species. Myth-claim 3 shifts the argument from self-segregation to segregation; and Myth-claim 4 shifts it again from the *level* of segregation to its *movement over time*.

There is one instance in which two of these four claims are related logically to each other: if there is no self-segregation in general, then there can be no residential self-segregation in particular. Thus Myth-claim 1 implies Myth-claim 2 (but not vice versa). All the other pairs of myth-claims are logically independent of each other, so that, for example, segregation might be either increasing or decreasing (Myth-claim 4) from any given level, either high or low (Myth-claim 3).<sup>15</sup> It follows that (with the single exception of Myth-claim 1’s relationship to Myth-claim 2), any set of evidence that is conclusive for or against any of the myth-claims is not conclusive for or against any of the other myth-claims. They will therefore need to be assessed against different kinds of evidence.

Myth-claim 1—about self-segregation in general—encapsulates the headline message that the reader is intended to carry away from Simpson’s analysis. However, the data presented by Simpson relate only to patterns of residence, so that the most they could prove

is Myth-claim 2.<sup>16</sup> Yet Simpson’s figures do not bear on Myth-claim 2 either, since they involve segregation rather than self-segregation. The evidence bearing on Myth-claim 2 is mainly anecdotal and circumstantial, with the principal exception of the Phillips’ team’s research discussed earlier. In so far as this body of evidence can be relied upon, it indicates that residential self-segregation is taking place and is thus no myth. And the same evidence carries the same implication for Myth-claim 1, because of the logical relationship between the two claims.<sup>17</sup> Since Simpson has no grounds for thinking that self-segregation is non-existent, either in general terms or in terms of residential patterns, and some grounds at least for thinking that it does exist in both cases, it becomes clear that *Myth-claims 1 and 2 are invalid*. In particular, Myth-claim 1—the headline claim—is a mis-claimed Myth-claim.

What, then, of Myth-claims 3 and 4, which are the only claims on which his main evidence bears? Table 2 reports the levels of residential segregation in Bradford in recent years, according to the statistical measures that are used conventionally for this purpose, calculated at two different levels of aggregation: the fine-grained ED level and the coarser-grained ward level.<sup>18</sup>

The data in Table 2 confirm the general point that the numerical values of the indices vary with the level of aggregation chosen, so that care is required in comparing indices drawn from different datasets, whether these refer to the same city or to different parts of the world. The data show nevertheless that all the indices have maintained *very high values throughout the decade*. It follows that *residential segregation is no myth in Bradford*, however, it is measured.

It is worth noting that a value of the Dissimilarity Index above 0.6, coupled with a value of the (minority ethnic) Isolation Index above 0.3, is used as the *definition* of a ghetto in one US study (Cutler *et al.*, 1999; cited in

**Table 2.** Indices of segregation for the South Asian population of Bradford, 1991–2001

	<i>Dissimilarity index</i>	<i>Corrected SA isolation index</i>	<i>SA isolation index</i>
<i>Census enumeration districts<sup>a</sup></i>			
1991	0.75	0.39	0.53
1996	0.74	0.41	0.57
2001	0.74	0.42	0.62
<i>Electoral wards<sup>b</sup></i>			
1991	0.59	0.24	0.37
1996	0.59	0.24	0.41
2001	0.59	0.27	0.47

<sup>a</sup> Sources: Simpson (2004, Table 2); Johnston *et al.* (2005, p. 1223).

<sup>b</sup> Source: Simpson data.

Burgess and Wilson, 2003, p. 8). The ED level indices exceed these figures with some margin to spare and the ward level indices come very close. According to all these measures, then, South Asians in Bradford were as thoroughly segregated as the Black population in some of the most segregated US cities. And this situation persisted throughout the 1990s. This finding is confirmed by other data given in Poulsen (2005).<sup>19</sup> Myth-claim 3 is therefore false, like Myth-claims 1 and 2. There can be absolutely no doubt that residential segregation is a significant phenomenon in Bradford, both at the ED level and the ward level.<sup>20</sup>

Does Myth-claim 4 at least remain valid, in line with the argument offered by Simpson (2004)? Did residential segregation increase or not in Bradford during the 1990s? It appears from the figures in Table 2 that the answer is liable to depend on which index is used to measure 'segregation'. This issue is explored in the next two sections.

### The Dissimilarity Index, 'Comfort Zones' and Middle-class Flight

As its name suggests, the Dissimilarity Index measures the extent to which the spatial distribution profiles of ethnic groups are dissimilar. In the current context, this means the extent to which the South Asian and White

populations are distributed in dissimilar enumeration districts (or wards) *compared with the distributions of the respective groups across all EDs (or wards)*. Thus, to take one example, 22 per cent of the South Asian population of Bradford lived in a single ward (University Ward) in 1991; whereas only 2 per cent of the (much larger) White population lived in the same ward. University Ward then makes a numerical contribution to the index equal to the (absolute) difference in these two proportions, that is  $(0.22 - 0.02) = 0.20$ . The value of the index is calculated by summing these contributions across all the wards in the District.

The Dissimilarity Index is defined on the unit interval  $[0, 1]$ , with a minimum value of zero and a maximum of one. It is symmetrical, in the sense that the value of the index calculated between two groups A and B is unaffected by the order in which the calculation takes place:  $\text{Dissimilarity}(A, B) = \text{Dissimilarity}(B, A)$ .<sup>21</sup>

The index has another formal property of more substantial interest. The value of the index remains unchanged by uniform growth (or shrinkage) of the populations of either (or both) ethnic groups (Simpson, 2004; Johnston *et al.*, 2005). Thus, if there is a combination of net migration of the South Asian population into the Bradford District and natural increase of the existing South

Asian population that affects the South Asian population of each ED (or ward) in the same proportional manner, the Dissimilarity Index will remain unchanged. The same applies to the corresponding changes for the White population (see Appendix 2). This remains true even if there is a *difference in the rates* of migration and/or natural increase between the two populations. In fact, the latter was the case for Bradford in the 1990s. The South Asian population grew by about 44 per cent during this period and the White population actually declined, by almost 6 per cent.

If this invariance property of the index is set alongside the striking fact (from Table 2) that the numerical values of the index remained constant at both the ED level and the ward level throughout the 1990s (to within a margin of 0.01), it becomes natural to ask if these two findings are linked. Did the Dissimilarity Index remain constant *because* the population changes in Bradford reflected processes of migration, birth and death acting uniformly throughout the District, but at different rates for the respective ethnic groups?

This hypothesis can be tested directly, since, if it were true, the populations of each group within each ward (or ED) would change by the same respective proportions—that is, by +44 per cent for the South Asian populations and by -6 per cent for the White populations. I will call deviations from this pattern ‘trend-relative’, because they are deviations relative to the overall trends of population change for the decade. Such deviations will provide evidence either for non-uniform patterns of migration and/or natural increase<sup>22</sup> or for net movements of members of the respective groups from one part of the District to another.

The results of such an analysis are very instructive. Wards in Bradford gained an average of 959 South Asian residents and lost an average of 781 White (‘Other’) residents during the course of the 1990s. If uniform patterns of migration and/or natural increase

were solely responsible for the observed population changes, the deviation from proportional increases in numbers for each ward would be zero. In fact, the standard deviations for the trend-relative changes are 796 for the South Asian population and 1336 for the White population. These are high values, which suggest very strongly that there was considerable movement of the different population groups *within the Bradford District*, over and above any changes that were also brought about by differential patterns of migration and natural increase.

In order to gain greater insight into the nature of these movements, the data for the wards with the highest levels of trend-relative population change (both above and below the trend) are set out in Table 3, together with information about the levels of deprivation in them. When numbers of a given group are lost from one area of a city and reappear in another, it is not of course possible to infer directly that the change is caused by the relocation of families from the first area to the second. The patterns evident in Table 3 are nevertheless very suggestive.<sup>23</sup>

A familiar story about the migration and settlement of minority ethnic groups holds that members of the group establish themselves first in particular areas, usually in or around the inner city, by a process of ‘chain migration’ (Ballard, 1994, p. 11). They then disperse progressively towards the suburbs as the successive generations develop both the desire and the ability to move on and move out.<sup>24</sup> Simpson (2005, p. 1229) has called this process a “basic shape of natural growth and dispersal”.

Parts of the evidence for Bradford are certainly consistent with the ‘basic shape’. It was mentioned earlier that the net increase in South Asian population is heavily concentrated in the neighbourhoods in which South Asians form more than three-quarters of the population. This is consistent with patterns of both natural increase and chain migration.

**Table 3.** Largest (positive and negative) population changes relative to growth trends: Bradford wards by ethnic group and deprivation rank, 1991–2001

Ward	Deprivation	South Asian	Other	Deprivation	Ward
	rank index <sup>a</sup>	population:	population:	rank index	
	2004	change	change	2004	
		1991–2001	1991–2001		
Toller	9	860	2231	68	Craven
Bradford Moor	5	603	2012	50	Idle
Clayton	32	511	1885	57	Worth Valley
Bowling	6	–198	–2599	5	Bradford Moor
Keighley North	37	–629	–2706	9	Toller
University	9	–4065	–2823	4	Little Horton

<sup>a</sup> The Rank Index of Deprivation for each ward is calculated as a weighted average of the indices for all the census Super Output Areas (SOAs) contained in the ward. SOAs are ranked on a national basis for England. The ward figures were obtained from the Bradford Community Statistics Project ([www.communitystats.org.uk](http://www.communitystats.org.uk)) and converted into percentile form. The index thus runs from 1 (most deprived) to 100 (least deprived).

Sources: Simpson data; BCSP (2006).

And the greatest trend-relative loss of South Asian residents occurs from the historical centre of immigration, University ward, which still has the highest number (and percentage) of South Asian residents of any ward. It is also an area of multiple deprivation, comprising the innermost section, one might say, of the inner city, ranked at the ninth percentile of deprivation amongst all the areas in England. This evidence is consistent with a pattern of outward dispersal from poorer inner-city areas.

It is when the putative destinations of South Asian relocation are considered that the doubts begin to arise about the correspondence between ‘the basic shape’ and the situation in Bradford. First, the wards that have shown the greatest trend-relative gains of South Asian populations are still within the inner city, by most reckonings of that elastic concept. They are hardly ‘suburban’, although they are slightly further away from the city centre than University ward itself.<sup>25</sup> Recall that these gains are gains *above the trend level*, which is already set at 44 per cent growth, so they imply large changes in population numbers overall

in the areas affected. Such areas have been called ‘comfort zones’ for the South Asian population, on the grounds that they are close enough to the existing centres for their new residents to feel comfortable within them (Alam and Husband, 2006, p. 25). “Growing suburbanisation was notable” echoes Phillips (2006, p. 35) of her South Asian respondents “but so too was a movement of younger people in particular into areas adjacent to the established community clusters”.

Secondly, the putative outward movement does not conform to a straightforward process by which Simpson’s “migration of the relatively affluent” (2004, p. 668) takes people from the inner city into more salubrious surroundings, to live in zones that are comfortable in the material sense as well as the psychological sense. The pattern is much more mixed. Among the primary wards of South Asian population growth, Clayton is considerably less deprived than University ward, at the 33rd percentile of the national rankings, and movements there would conform to the basic shape of semi-suburban dispersal. However, Toller has very similar

social conditions to University ward (they are ranked at the same percentile), and both are outranked by Bradford Moor. This is one of the most deprived wards in Bradford, whose general condition is equivalent to the worst 20th of neighbourhoods within England as a whole. Any relocation between University ward and Bradford Moor is a movement outwards in geographical terms but downwards in terms of the built or lived environments. Phillips and Radcliffe have also reported that:

So far, more Asian families in Leeds have moved to the suburbs than in Bradford. Sikh and Hindu families have tended to move outwards more than Muslim families, with Leeds-based Muslims having suburbanized more than Muslims in Bradford (Phillips and Radcliffe, 2005, p. 1).

Overall, then, there is reason to doubt that South Asian population changes conform with a straightforward “movement by all groups [that] is dependent on the means to move rather than racially motivated”, still less that it can be described as ‘middle-class flight’. Even if it turns out to be true (indeed, even if it counts as a truism) that relocation involves “the migration of the relatively affluent”, this truth does not rule out the possibility of growing ethnic segregation. Contrary to the implication of the quotation, economic and ‘racial’ motivations are not mutually exclusive.

If internal migration was indeed ethnically blind, then putative movements would tend to have the same origins and destinations for all ethnic groups, with members of every group leaving similar parts of the inner city, say, for similar parts of the suburbs. In fact, the points of (putative) origin and destination are sharply differentiated between the ethnic groups. We have seen that Toller ward and Bradford Moor show the greatest trend-relative *increases* in the South Asian population. However, these wards also show

the second- and third-highest trend-relative *losses* among the White population. In other words, it looks as if relatively large numbers of the White population were moving out of Toller and Bradford Moor at exactly the same time that relatively large numbers of the South Asian population were moving in. The combination of these two movements—each of which is an outlier of its corresponding statistical distribution—creates a very dramatic change of the ethnic composition of the wards, which moved in both cases from about 50 per cent South Asian population to about 70 per cent in the space of a decade. These are evidently the pivotal wards for understanding the recent history of ethnic population change in Bradford.

Where did the White former residents of these wards go? We cannot be sure, but we do know that the places with the largest numerical gains of White population above the trend are much more suburban than Toller or Bradford Moor. In fact, both Worth Valley and Craven are more rural than suburban and are situated about 10 miles and 15 miles respectively from the centre of Bradford. These possible destinations are much lower down the league table of deprivation, at the national median or beyond, and well beyond in the case of Craven. This putative movement presents a clearer picture of ‘middle-class flight’ than any of the previous examples. But if the ‘middle-class’ description fits the bill, it is equally clear that we are dealing with a form of middle-class flight that is differentiated ethnically. White middle-class flight appears to consist of a movement away from places precisely like the South Asian ‘comfort zones’ to other areas which are further away from the inner city, in the genuine suburbs or rural areas surrounding Bradford.

In short, the constancy of the Dissimilarity Index tends to conceal rather than to reveal quite complex population movements that imply substantial changes in the ethnic composition of various parts of the District.<sup>26</sup>

The question for the next section is whether the Dissimilarity Index can be improved upon and a better vehicle found for conveying these changes in summary form.

### The Isolation Index and the Experience of Residential Segregation

It is not easy to find an interpretation for the Dissimilarity Index that is intuitively meaningful. If I am told, for example, that my immediate neighbourhood contains 3 per cent of Bradford's White population and 7 per cent of its South Asian population (which was true of my home neighbourhood in 2001), it is not clear (to me at least) what I am supposed to make of the news. It is usually mentioned that the natural interpretation of the index is the minimum proportion of the respective ethnic populations that would have to relocate within a city in order to achieve an exact similarity of ethnic profile across all areas of the city. Thus, at least 75 per cent of the South Asian population (or of the White population) would have to relocate across ED boundaries in order to achieve an even distribution in Bradford; at least 60 per cent would have to move across ward boundaries. This information may tell me that short-range movements are unlikely to be sufficient to even out the residential distribution in Bradford, but I do not find it easy to imagine what a 60 per cent ward-level relocation, say, would look like or feel like. It has no obvious anchorage point in everyday experience.

The Isolation Index, by contrast, does have an obvious intuitive interpretation. It corresponds to the ethnic composition of his or her residential area experienced by the average member of a given ethnic group.<sup>27</sup> Thus, Table 2 says that the average South Asian in 2001 lived in a ward with a South Asian proportion of 47 per cent (and in an ED with a South Asian proportion of 62 per cent). This relates directly, of course, to

everyday perceptions of the ethnic balance of neighbourhoods. These perceptions form a component—perhaps the predominant component—of the 'racialisation of space' discussed by Phillips, which feeds in turn into processes of self-segregation.

The Isolation Index suffers, however, from two formal defects as an index number. First, it is not defined on the unit interval. Although it has a maximum value of 1.0, its minimum value is given by the proportion of the relevant ethnic group in the whole population.<sup>28</sup>

Secondly, it is not symmetrical, since for example the ward-level Isolation Index for 'Others' in 2001 is 0.87, whereas the equivalent index for South Asians is 0.47. On the one hand, this difference corresponds to an important aspect of the lived experience. White residents in 2001 were living on average in residential environments that remained remarkably 'White' (that is, 87 per cent 'White'), despite the ethnic diversity of the district. As Phillips observes

The 'problem' of white segregation passes without comment, and the overwhelming whiteness of the suburbs or the outer-city schools in multiracial cities like Bradford tends to go unnoticed (Phillips, 2006, p. 29).

On the other hand, it is not clear that it is helpful to use the terminology of 'isolation' in this context. The asymmetry of the measure entails the proposition for two groups A and B that group A can be more isolated from group B than group B is isolated from group A. It is not obvious that this statement makes any sense.<sup>29</sup>

As its title suggests, the Corrected Isolation Index introduces a correction that is intended to take account of the fact that the minimum value of the Isolation Index is greater than zero, which is not good form for a respectable index number. The problem is that the correction does not go far enough, in that the Corrected Index is still not defined on the unit interval and remains asymmetrical. It turns

out that a further correction of the index can be made that resolves both difficulties simultaneously. What I propose to call the Separation Index measures the extent to which (two) ethnic groups are located in separate areas, given the constraints imposed by the overall proportions of the (two) groups in the whole population. This measure is closely related to both the Corrected Isolation Index and the Isolation Index (they are all linear transforms of each other for groups of given total size), but it is defined on the unit interval and it is symmetrical. It thus resembles the Dissimilarity Index in its formal properties, although it is not invariant to uniform rates of change in the ethnic groups.<sup>30</sup> The construction of the Separation Index nevertheless makes all due allowances for changes in the overall numbers of the ethnic groups, whilst at the same time satisfying the formal requirements for a summary index number. Table 4 exhibits the movement over time of the Separation Index at both ED level and ward level.

The important point to emerge from Table 4 is that the Separation Index increased during the 1990s, at both levels of aggregation. This finding constitutes clear evidence that, taking account of the net effect of all the various sources of change—migration into and out of the district, birth and death among the existing population and internal movement within the district—the mutual geographical segregation of the South Asian and White populations increased during the 1990s.

**Table 4.** Indices of Separation between the South Asian and Other populations of Bradford, 1991–2001

	<i>Enumeration district level</i>	<i>Ward level</i>
1991	0.45	0.27
1996	0.49	0.29
2001	0.54	0.34

Source: Simpson data.

So, in view of all of these considerations, is Myth-claim 4 valid or invalid? Given the polemical strength of any claim that something is a myth—providing thereby “a purely fictitious narrative”, in the words of the *Oxford English Dictionary*—it seems fair to say that a phenomenon cannot be mythical if there is a legitimate sense in which belief in it is true. Yet there is a legitimate sense in which segregation is increasing, because the South Asian Isolation Indices are all increasing and, above all, the symmetrical Separation Index is increasing. It follows that Myth-claim 4 is invalid, as well as Myth-claims 1–3. None of Simpson’s myth-claims, either explicit or inferred, therefore withstands critical scrutiny in the light of the evidence from his own statistical sources.

## From Segregation to Polarisation

The discussion so far has outlined some of the main features of residential segregation, showing that it is running at a high level in Bradford and increasing in some respects. Educational segregation is also known to be extensive and to have reached higher levels among schools than within their surrounding neighbourhoods (Burgess and Wilson, 2003, p. 8; Burgess *et al.*, 2005, p. 1050).<sup>31</sup> Joyce Miller, who is now Head of Diversity and Cohesion for Education Bradford, has expressed the view that

Few schools [in Bradford] could be described as multi-cultural; rather, they serve mono-cultural populations of Muslim or White pupils (Miller, 2004, p. 2).<sup>32</sup>

Although the existence of these segregated patterns is thus well established, much less is known about the reasons for their existence. We can be confident, for example, that self-segregation exists (as well as segregation) and that observed changes in ethnic distributions are broadly consistent with the outcomes of self-segregation processes. However, there is

very little research that connects outcomes with process directly, by investigating, say, the exact reasons for the relocation of South Asian Muslim families from the inner city into comfort zones, or the factors influencing their choice of schools. There has been even less investigation (almost none, in fact) into the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of White, or for that matter non-Muslim, residents of Bradford (Darlow, 2005, p. 10). Commentators may have their own views about 'White flight' or 'non-Muslim religious self-segregation', but the precise experiences and motivations lying behind these putative trends have yet to be examined.

In general, the analysis of statistical patterns and numerical tendencies tells us nothing directly about the issues of greatest concern, which have to do with the quality of social relationships and the ways these are likely to evolve in the future. It is perfectly possible to live nextdoor to people and yet conduct a parallel life that is largely disconnected from them—'minding one's own business' being one of the watchwords of neighbourliness in Britain.<sup>33</sup> It is equally possible to be closely involved with people who live on the other side of town. At the same time, the prevalence of ethnic marking, which is confirmed by the Phillips research as well as being a matter of everyday experience for anyone familiar with Bradford, is bound to generate concerns for the future. The rest of this paper engages with these concerns, focusing especially on the dangers of cultural and political polarisation as one possible, and deeply undesirable, future for the Bradford District.

## Ethnic Marking and Polarisation

Deborah Phillips has acknowledged that "there is ... a clear racialisation of space in Bradford" (Phillips, 2006, p. 32) and much of Alam and Husband's (2006, pp. 26–29) interview data with British-Pakistani male subjects

points in the same direction. However, this type of ethnic marking need not apply only to residential neighbourhoods. It can extend to a range of other facilities and institutions, including not only places of worship, but community centres and meeting-places, parks, fields and burial grounds; schools and colleges, housing units, sporting clubs, academic departments, pubs and cafes, restaurants, leisure facilities and so on. It applies to persons, of course, but also to dress codes, food, language, cultural practices, daily happenings and historical events, 'fundamental values' and even garden layouts or driving habits (in some minds at least). Its primary points of reference seem to have shifted over the past two decades from race to religion, or, more accurately, from race to a combination of race and religion. This trend is also borne out by some of the findings of the Phillips team and by the commentary in Alam and Husband (2006).<sup>34</sup>

To avoid misunderstanding, I am not in the least claiming that this marking process is omnipresent. It exists in various forms and to various extents in all of these different domains. In many of its manifestations it is comparatively mild, with low emotional temperature, and is (arguably) relatively harmless in its effects. And since we are dealing with meanings, social attachments and personal feelings, the marking process is likely to be ambivalent in any case and may not even be conscious. These are slippery areas, as post-modernism has taught us, and 'sensitive' too, in the Bradford context. Yet it does not follow that an ambivalent phenomenon is any less real in its effects and the sensitivity about describing it—which still functions as a fully-fledged taboo in many public and official contexts within the District—is a testament to the underlying reality of ethnic marking and not to its insignificance.

Concerns about polarisation in the future refer to a process by which the existing

varieties of ethnic marking could tend to become

- more widespread (applying to an increasing range of social contexts);
- more salient (crowding-out alternative perceptions or considerations within each context), and especially;
- more conflict-ridden (associated with sharper feelings or perceptions of cultural difference and antagonism, possibly coupled with more hostile or violent actions and reactions).

The process of polarisation is thus distinguished analytically from both segregation and self-segregation. However, the logical independence of these phenomena does not imply their empirical dissociation. In particular, it seems plausible to infer that a high level of polarisation will create a high level of segregation, if only for security reasons—it becomes unsafe for anyone to live in, or even to be seen in, the ‘wrong’ place. This would apply, for example, to the most polarised parts of a city such as Belfast during the most polarised periods of its history. It may also be reasonable to expect in such cases that the separation of the population groups has come about in large measure by self-conscious decision—that is, through a process of self-segregation, in which everyone is able to read the signs—the flags, the names, the *graffiti* on the walls, the sense of threat and so on—as part of the folk knowledge of a place, and to act accordingly.

Suppose conversely that segregation is completely absent, so that members of different ethnic groups are distributed at random across all social spaces.<sup>35</sup> It is difficult to believe that in these circumstances there can be any underlying problems with the quality of the relationship between the groups. Similarly, if people are rarely influenced in their decisions by ethnic factors (so that ethnic, racial or religious self-segregation does

not occur), it is difficult to see how a process of polarisation could get off the ground. Hence, an absence of segregation implies an absence of polarisation and an absence of self-segregation likewise. The general formula embracing all of the possibilities covered in the preceding two paragraphs is that polarisation implies segregation and self-segregation (but not vice versa).

This conclusion has methodological implications. Since segregation is necessary but not sufficient for polarisation and polarisation rather than segregation *per se* is the object of major social concern, the statistical analysis of segregation takes on a diagnostic, rather than a conclusive, role. The statistical analysis can be used to identify those areas of high segregation which generate potential cause for concern. Other kinds of evidence must then be deployed in order to establish whether these concerns are likely to materialise—that is, whether segregation has led to, or is likely to lead to, polarisation. A spectrum of possibilities then opens up for any given case. The example of the English and the Dutch was given earlier as an instance of (European-level) residential segregation. Yet no-one (I take it) thinks that war is imminent between these two nations. Here is segregation without polarisation, at the harmonious end of the spectrum. In situations at the other end of the spectrum, with Belfast perhaps the most vivid UK case in point, segregation has been bound up intimately with chronic forms of conflict-laden polarisation.<sup>36</sup> Whereabouts, then, is Bradford located along this spectrum at the moment and where on this spectrum might it move in future?

## The Preconditions of Polarisation

It follows from the previous analysis that segregation and self-segregation form two of the preconditions of polarisation. Both of these preconditions exist in Bradford. A more detailed account of the District’s

ethnic composition will help to explain how polarisation might develop out of these existing patterns.

Although Bradford's multiculturalism is quite complicated and historically multi-layered, it is convenient to think of the population as composed of majority ethnic (White) and minority ethnic (Black) sub-populations, each of which contain their own majorities and minorities, as follows.<sup>37</sup>

The White majority is of predominantly British and/or Irish origin and there are a number of White minorities of longstanding, including those whose origins lie in eastern or southern Europe, the Baltic states, or the Ukraine. Recent migration from eastern Europe has added to some of these population groups and is said to have given rise to tensions with both the White majority and South Asian minority populations.

The majority within the Black minority is of Pakistani (especially Mirpuri) origins and Muslim faith, with smaller numerical 'minorities within the minority' which are of African-Caribbean heritage, of Hindu or Sikh faith, or of Muslim faith with geographical origins in parts of the world other than Pakistan, especially Bangladesh. What distinguishes Bradford from other centres of immigration in the UK, especially the received image of multicultural London, is, however, the numerical predominance within the minority ethnic population of a group with a specific set of geographical and cultural origins, which tends to give the group a ready-made foundation for internal cohesion.

The principal danger of polarisation then arises not between 'White' and 'Black' as general categories, or even between 'White' and 'South Asian', but between the White majority and the population of Pakistani origin and Muslim faith who form the majority *within* the minority ethnic population. The reasons for this have to do with a range of different social and cultural factors, and with recent

politics and history. I discuss these two sets of factors in the next two sections.

## The Social and Cultural Ingredients of Polarisation

The first factor to consider is the general influence of the British social environment. This influence includes the consequences of Britain's long history of colonial dominance of the Indian sub-continent, a predominantly secular culture and polity still marked by its Christian heritage, and a complex legacy of racist attitudes and beliefs. On the one hand, there has been a noteworthy—and indeed praiseworthy, although still incomplete—attempt of the official culture and the main institutions over the past generation to recognise the existence of racism and to counter its effects. On the other hand, there is a persistence of racist attitudes and behaviour among sections of the White population. The most troubling overt indicator of this phenomenon in Bradford is the recent level of electoral support for the far right in recent elections, which I consider further in the next section.

A second group of factors concerns the demographic trends in the racial and ethnic composition of the District's population. The estimation of such trends is subject to a number of technical difficulties. It is only recently that the Office of National Statistics has concluded that these difficulties can be overcome in principle (Haskey, 2002)<sup>38</sup> and there are as yet no authoritative projections for Bradford. There are nevertheless a number of indications that the proportion of minority ethnic groups within the total population is bound to increase very substantially from the level of 20.5 per cent recorded at the 2001 Census. Bradford Health Academy (2005) estimates that the proportion will reach 28 per cent by 2011. About 30 per cent of Bradford's school population is currently minority ethnic and 25 per cent is Muslim, including

23.9 per cent of Pakistani heritage (Miller, 2004, p. 2).<sup>39</sup> Simpson has estimated that nearly 40 per cent of live births in Bradford over the period from July 1995 to June 1998 belonged to minority ethnic groups, with the Pakistani group contributing 33 per cent (Simpson; in Haskey, 2002, p. 62, Figure 2). Perhaps most significantly, 27 per cent of live births in Bradford in 2003 were to mothers born in the New Commonwealth or Pakistan (ONS, 2004, Table 9.2).<sup>40</sup> It seems very likely, then, that the minority ethnic population will form over 30 per cent of the total within the medium term and it may well reach a higher figure. The majority within this total is likely to consist of Muslims of Pakistani origin, whose proportional contribution in the foreseeable future may well double at least from the level of 14.5 per cent recorded in the 2001 Census.

*Pace* Simpson, this is not a problem in itself, although it would at the same time be astonishing if a cultural shift of this potential magnitude were to take place without some friction and challenges of adjustment.<sup>41</sup> The growth of relative numbers becomes a more sharply focused challenge—and, to emphasise the point, a challenge for *all* citizens in Bradford, not just a challenge for citizens of particular ethnic backgrounds—because it is taking place in the context of the other factors considered in this paper.

The relevance of absolute numbers is that the Muslim population of Bradford, which reached just over 70 000 in 2001, has been large enough for some time to sustain a rich variety of distinctive institutions. These are not just holding operations for recent migrants, supporting them in the early phases of their entry into the host society, as Simpson's (2005a, p. 1229) "demographic process of natural growth and geographical dispersal" might be taken to suggest.<sup>42</sup> They are indicative of a collective desire to create and sustain what Ballard (1994, p. 11) has called "ethnic colonies" over the longer term.<sup>43</sup>

It follows that the process of 'integration' is not just a question of the way in which individual migrants come to participate within the institutions of 'White' society, but the way in which two institutionalised orders—one 'White/British' and the other 'Muslim/Pakistani/British'—come to relate to each other, bearing in mind that these institutional orders tend to operate by different ground rules in a number of significant respects.<sup>44</sup> For this reason, the term 'accommodation' seems preferable to 'integration' for describing the aspiration towards a non-polarised future.

And the institutions requiring accommodation are not all confined within the official boundaries of the Bradford Metropolitan District, or indeed within the UK as a whole. The population of Mirpuri background in Bradford maintains and develops on-going links with the sub-continent in at least four ways, through

- family visiting and the maintenance of *biradari* networks;
- financial transfers and business links;
- transcontinental marriage; and
- the recruitment of Imams (Macey, 2006, p. 156; Lewis, 2002).

This pattern of relationships might be regarded as 'circulation' (between two fixed points geographically) rather than 'migration' (from one point to another).<sup>45</sup> In one respect, circulation—and especially transcontinental marriage—acts to reproduce within Bradford the experience of a 'new' immigrant population, even after three generations of continuous settlement (Bühler *et al.*, 2002, p. 7). From another perspective, it means that the city's geographical hinterland includes parts of Azad Kashmir in addition to the Yorkshire Dales. 'Greater Bradford' is not as it appears on the Ordnance Survey map and the situation in the District is in some respects quite distinctive: relationships within the district are (in significant senses) bi-cultural

rather than multicultural and the experience of the largest minority ethnic group remains bi-continental rather than mono-locational.

These structural features of the migrant experience mean that young people in the District with different backgrounds may have experienced quite different forms of socialisation, even if they are living in close proximity to each other. This is likely to have complex and potentially confusing effects on the identities of young people, and the ways in which these are expressed.<sup>46</sup>

On the one hand, young people of Pakistani Muslim background in effect have two kinds of career option, in addition to facing whatever obstacles White racism throws into their path. They can make their way either in the White institutions or in their 'home' or 'community' institutions, and this may place conflicting demands upon them. Alam and Husband (2006, p. 51) have commented, for example, on the "the strong social networks and the extensive structure of small 'Asian' enterprises [in Bradford] ... where 'work can be found'" for the British-Pakistani men in their sample, in ways that contrast with "the future possibility of a more geographically mobile female workforce" to be found among their (typically) better-educated sisters.<sup>47</sup>

Non-Muslim young people may on the other hand be subject to a range of cultural influences that are unlike those shared by their peers elsewhere in the country. These are in principle positive, although the positive aspects are not translated into practice in every case. I have in mind especially the experience of being in a 'minority' ethnic situation, either in a residential area, a school or some other local context. And, to reiterate the contrast, this is not like the experience of 'Hackney multiculturalism' celebrated by the sociologist Jock Young (2001, p. 1), who describes his residential area of Stoke Newington as "a constituency of intermixed diversity, an enclave of minorities", where numerous nationalities contribute a small

quota each towards the local mix and none of which can therefore set a prevailing cultural tone.<sup>48</sup> Given the patterns of segregation in Bradford, White young people, or for that matter those of Hindu, Sikh or African-Caribbean heritage, can find themselves in a small numerical minority among a much larger numerical majority. However, this (Muslim) majority is cohesive, in the sense that it brings to the classroom or to the street a set of cultural assumptions and experiences that are strongly shared within the group and yet are practically inaccessible to the minority within their midst. It is a moot point whether the minority in such circumstances is ever subject to a form of racism, but the minority situation can in some circumstances represent a variety of social exclusion that may have effects similar to those of racism in other contexts.<sup>49</sup>

Much more research is required into the ways in which young people negotiate all these pressures and contradictions. Yet there is at least some evidence that the perceptions of ethnic difference have set in by the primary school stage, where they are already affecting the quality of social relationships (see the recorded interview with David Fitch, in Fitch, 2005, pp. 4–6). Two conclusions are relevant to the argument about polarisation. First, that these structurally conditioned experiences of young people will almost certainly affect future decisions about family formation, place of residence, employment and lifestyle, and thus the trajectories of self-segregation in the future. Secondly, that these issues are likely to persist, because there is no reason to believe that the structural features of migration underlying them are likely to change in the foreseeable future.

## The Possibility of Polarisation

The social and cultural ingredients of polarisation are formed, then, by the British environment, coupled with existing patterns

of segregation, differential socialisation, demographic numbers and trends, structural features of the migrant experience and significant differences in the approach to underlying values. Polarisation itself is only likely to emerge through a process in which self-segregation becomes increasingly *politicised*, and thereby progressively intensified.

I mentioned earlier that it is no easy matter to specify the exact nature of the proper concerns raised by segregation and self-segregation. It may be that this is not a critical failing, since in this area broad brush strokes will suffice. I take it then that most people in Bradford, from every section of the community, would prefer to experience a District in which every citizen felt secure enough to move freely around every neighbourhood, as opposed to a place divided into a patchwork quilt of rival ethnic fiefdoms. And I assume that most people would prefer a District in which growing prosperity was evenly shared, rather than a District divided between a relatively affluent majority and a deeply alienated underclass, partially defined in each case by race and religion. Supporters of such views, we may suppose, constitute a political majority who are opposed to polarisation. This supposed common goal cuts across received political boundaries—including party allegiances and positions on the mainstream spectrum of left-to-right—as well as ethnic and religious affiliations.

However, it is important to recognise that not everyone shares such a goal. Two groupings in particular *share an active interest in promoting polarisation*. These are the fascist parties on the one hand and the *jihadi* Islamist groups on the other.

Concern over the growth in electoral support for the BNP was noted earlier. The BNP stood 10 candidates in the municipal elections of 2004. Four of its candidates were elected and the number of BNP voters totalled at least 12 079. The lowest proportion of votes gained by a BNP candidate was 16.5 per cent, and the highest 33.1 per cent, with a mean value of

26.5 per cent.<sup>50</sup> In the General (parliamentary) Election of 2005, BNP candidates stood in five of the District's constituencies, recording votes from 2000 (Shipley) to 4240 (Keighley). The total number of votes cast was 13 688. No fascist candidate was elected, or even came close to election, but three Bradford constituencies recorded three of the four highest far-right shares of the vote in the Yorkshire and Humberside Region, between 7 per cent and 9 per cent.<sup>51</sup> The BNP fielded more candidates in the municipal elections of 2006 than in 2004—16 rather than 10. Although the number of council seats declined—from 4 to 2—the number of votes cast increased to 18 212, which is 24.5 per cent of the votes cast in the wards with a BNP candidate. They were the second party in 9 wards, which is almost a third of the total number of wards in Bradford (Schofield, 2006). In the most recent local elections of 2007, BNP candidates stood in 17 wards. The number of BNP councillors was maintained at 2, although the total number of votes declined from the year before, to 14 130, which represented 18.6 per cent of the vote in the wards with BNP candidates. Despite the fluctuations in the level of support, there is little doubt that the far right had established an electoral presence by 2007.<sup>52</sup>

Very little research has yet been conducted into the reasons for this recent growth in support. If it is in part a protest vote, it is not clear exactly what the protest is about; if it is tactical, it is not clear what the tactic is intended to achieve. And fascist voters no doubt come from a variety of social backgrounds, with various degrees of adherence to fascist or racist ideologies.<sup>53</sup> A critical and comparative perspective should be maintained, as always. The unpalatable truth nevertheless remains that up to 18 000 citizens of Bradford, who had numerous alternative options, have chosen over the past few years to step across the line that has defined the boundary of reputable politics ever since the defeat of the Nazis in Europe 60 years ago.

These results will have broadcast a message about the unsavoury character of a substantial section of Bradford society that is hard to deny, thus giving another twist to polarisation, whilst intensifying the ethnic marking of those electoral wards in which support for the far right is most apparent. However, this is only one side of the story. As was mentioned earlier, *jihadi* Islamist groups which are active in the District, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, share an interest with the far right in ethnic polarisation.

This is not all that these ostensible antagonists have in common. Both groupings are highly authoritarian and subject to a cult of leadership. Hizb ut-Tahrir promotes a politicised version of religion that has been described by a respected commentator as “inflammatory—anti-democratic, anti-zionist, anti-Western, anti-Hindu, and anti-Sikh” (Lewis; cited by Macey, 2006, p. 154). They share a vision of the intrinsic incompatibility of ‘Islam’ with ‘the West’—one of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s publications is entitled *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisations* (2002) (and see Khan, 2004). Both are apparently living in expectations of a fantasy future—in the case of the BNP, a future for Britain in which the Black population is air-brushed from view; in the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a future for the world in which everyone converts to a particularly narrow and exclusive brand of Islam. Anti-semitism infects both camps. And both tend to reject negotiation and compromise as a solution to difficulties, to portray rigidity as a virtue, and to see violence as a desirable, and even obligatory, method of resolving differences.<sup>54</sup>

The publications of Hizb ut-Tahrir in particular are steeped in rhetorical violence.<sup>55</sup> Violence and mayhem have characterised the recent history of Bradford, including on the one side an undercurrent of racist incidents directed against minority ethnic members; on the other side, incidents of a similar type, but delivered in the opposite direction, coupled

with periodic episodes of communal violence, real or symbolic, threatened or applied.<sup>56</sup>

What has been called ‘territorialism’ in local debates is an aspect of these developments—that is, the more or less self-conscious attempt (usually by younger men) to mark out particular spaces as ‘ours’ as opposed to ‘theirs’ and to aspire to control them informally in the spirit of rightful possession.<sup>57</sup> Territorialism can apply to social spaces conceived quite generally, including areas within formal institutions, say, as well as residential neighbourhoods (see especially the Scott Report (Scott, 2003), which discusses aspects of this phenomenon in Bradford College).

The point here is two-fold. First, the presence of these authoritarian groups, which are at the margins of political life nationally, carry especial dangers in places like Bradford. This is because their authoritarian messages are likely to find some resonance within existing attitudes and social conditions: racism and xenophobia on the one hand, and religious exclusionism on the other, under general conditions of social segregation in which contrasting information may not be easy to obtain. In addition, there is a particular danger that these two political currents will feed off each other in the locality, as specific incidents or events are taken by the respective sides as evidence in favour of their stereotypical perceptions of the other: as evidence of the intractable racism and corruption of British society on the one side; as evidence of the inescapable inwardness or backwardness of the Muslim population on the other.<sup>58</sup> And news of the international situation, from the war in Iraq or the War on Terror, will not help, by feeding similar stereotypes into everyone’s living room on a daily basis, often nowadays through segregated media outlets catering for distinctive audiences.

Throughout this process, a response of moving closer to the people one sees as ‘one’s own’ and moving further away from the people one sees as ‘the other’ might intensify

self-segregation and thereby promote the mutual isolation of populations from which the political dangers arise in the first place. And such a sequence of response and counter-response is liable to become more volatile, rather than less volatile, as the principle of choice extends more widely into most aspects of public provision. This is because choice mechanisms invite market-like behaviour and markets are notoriously subject to prejudice, rumour and speculation.<sup>59</sup>

In short, entrenched polarisation could come about through a vicious circle: a form of feedback between political action (in the broad sense) and underlying social conditions that pushes ‘communities’—defined increasingly strictly as such—further and further apart. And, in so far as the marginal political ideologies—with their propensities for dichotomous thinking, coupled with violent imagery and language—are driving and/or reflecting this process, they will serve as accessible legitimations for racial-cum-religious antagonisms and conflict-oriented behaviour. The ‘communities’ thus evolved would therefore be set against each other and not just set apart from one another. A further consequence of polarisation between White-British and Pakistani-British populations brought about by such a process would be to squeeze out other minority ethnic groups, reducing genuine diversity and increasing the marginalisation in the district already reported for them.<sup>60</sup>

### Towards a Shared Future?

I have presented the scenario in the previous section—the ‘nightmare scenario’, if you will—in order to demonstrate how polarisation could come about through the development of processes and trends that can be seen at work already within the Bradford District, if things go sufficiently badly wrong.

We have seen Simpson dismiss as ‘mythical’ the social conditions out of which polarisation

might grow. Regarding the future more generally, he

predict[s] a trajectory of growing Asian communities in Bradford and similar cities for many years to come, as well as dispersal to other areas. We should reject any evaluation of this scenario as optimistic or pessimistic and instead focus on how to achieve improved housing and employment opportunities for all populations (Simpson, 2005a, p. 1230).

The thought seems to be that, if we can only look after the material base, the political and ideological superstructures will look after themselves. Yet it is not clear why it is necessary to eschew judgements about the future, abstaining thereby from a politics of future-oriented choice.

Alam and Husband (2006) adopt a different approach. On the one hand, they are even more opposed than Simpson to any idea of segregation. They regard talk of segregation as “majority ethnic rhetoric” (p. 53). They also speak explicitly of “the malign influence of this external gaze in the policy reviews of Ouseley, Cattle and Denham” (p. 53). And they outdo Simpson’s language of mere myth by speaking of the “fetish of segregation” and the “neurotic concern with ‘ethnic self-segregation’”. At the same time, they emphasise the “supportive ethnic infrastructure” of the inner city (p. 15) and the “variety of social relations and solidarity *within* the communities of the Bradford-‘Pakistani’ population”, apparently overlooking the fact that these communal social forms are created and sustained according to their evidence by processes of self-segregation (p. 55; original emphasis).

“*It is the social cohesion—of feeling, identification and networks—found within the communities*”, they go on to say, “*that counterbalances the economic forces of social exclusion generated by their location in the wider labour market and system of social resources*” (p. 56; original emphases). This

in turn is the basis for a guarded optimism about the future: “*it is arguable that it is the viability of the communities based on the urban locale that is currently the platform that enables the members of this ethnic minority population to maintain active and positive participation as Bradfordian citizens*” (p. 56; original emphasis). I would love to be convinced by Alam and Husband that multi-cultural separateness is a prelude to, or indeed a precondition for, creative re-engagement and active citizenship. However, they have given the reader no particular reason to believe that this positive outcome of events is more likely to occur than negative ones, which could arise equally well from the very social conditions they describe.<sup>61</sup>

The situation facing Bradford is in my view easy enough to state, although difficult to tackle. As Simpson says, there will be a growing population of South Asian heritage for many years to come. Phenomena of segregation and self-segregation are likely to persist, if only because the cultural and institutional factors underlying them are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Research needs to be focused on the evolving relationships between different population groups. To concentrate attention on just one group in the spirit of anthropological discovery, which has tended to happen to date with the Pakistani-British population, is to reproduce ethnic separation at the level of research methodology. For similar reasons, I would drop all reference to ‘communities’ in the plural in the Bradford context. There should be at most one community in Bradford, embracing the whole population.

Yet the future remains significantly open and there is a range of possible outcomes for the quality of social relationships in the District. Cultural assimilation appears unlikely either way (at least on a substantial scale), but accommodation between the members of groups with distinct traditions remains

possible, as does conflict-ridden polarisation between them.

Regarding this range of possible outcomes, there are some forces at work which lead in the direction of polarisation, as presented in the previous section’s nightmare scenario. Equally, there are a very large number of committed individuals and agencies who are working in the opposite direction, to counter polarisation, essentially by helping to build bridges between different population groups and to increase mutual understanding.<sup>62</sup> International comparisons suggest that this effort is worthwhile.<sup>63</sup>

Where the outcome will lie on the spectrum between polarisation and accommodation evidently depends on the relative strength of the forces pointing in the two directions. And the strength of these forces will depend in turn on the relative success of the interventions that are made with the respective outcomes in mind.

Consultation with a wide range of individuals who are active in the field of community cohesion within Bradford shows that a great deal of constructive work is going on.<sup>64</sup> This work supports good relations among citizens with different backgrounds and therefore favours accommodation. The outstanding questions are whether this activity

- is operating on a sufficient scale;
- is sufficiently well co-ordinated; and
- is conducted against a background of sufficient public understanding and consent,

to be as effective as might be necessary to ensure a non-polarised future for the Bradford District (*BXp12, BXp13, 2005*).

It was argued in the previous section that polarisation is essentially a political process, which is driven from the extremes. There is no shortage of condemnation of these extremes, although the condemnations are not always even-handed. What does seem to be lacking

is a practical specification of the alternatives to the extremes. A political vacuum exists where the public debate should be in Bradford about the realisation of a shared future. How do we accommodate the different 'fundamental values' and cultural practices? What does 'equality' imply in Bradford's diverse context, or 'toleration'? (How) does the policy of multiculturalism need to be modified in the light of past experience? What sort of Bradford, in short, are we hoping to inhabit in 20 or 30 years time? And how do we help that Bradford into being?

These questions go beyond the remit of this paper and none of them has an easy answer. Yet I believe we have more to gain by opening out the debates on these issues than by closing them down. Although there are some risks inherent in open debate, experience suggests that these can be overcome (Carling, 2007). And the risks of speech are outweighed in any case by the dangers of silence, because the main effect of silence is to lend aid and comfort to the forces from the extremes. The one purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the academic literature contains its own forms of denial. These serve to reinforce the taboos that prevent the public discussion of ethnic and religious difference and some contributions have tended to scare off debate by substituting rhetoric for analysis. I invite all those with the interests of Bradford's citizens at heart to contribute to an open process of dialogue about a shared future.

## Notes

1. The term 'Bradford District' refers to the local authority area of the Bradford and District Metropolitan Council, which covers a number of distinct urban centres such as Bingley, Ilkley, Keighley and Shipley in addition to the City of Bradford itself, as well as a large area of rural settlement.
2. The authority derived from the official status of the report as a publication of Bradford Council's Strategic Partner—Bradford Vision—and from the status of the author Sir Herman Ouseley as the then-Chair of the UK's Racial Equality Commission. Some similar themes had been aired in the *The Bradford Commission Report* (Allen and Barratt, 1996), which was published in the wake of the 1995 disturbances in the Manningham area of Bradford.
3. In other publications (Carling, 2007), I have preferred to use the term 'separation' for what I am here calling 'segregation', on the grounds that 'separation' carries less baggage from recent debates and offers a more neutral expression for an essentially statistical concept. I have retained 'segregation' in this paper precisely because I am engaging in the relevant debates.
4. It is established later (see note 15) that levels of segregation and self-segregation can move independently of each other. Simpson's statement that "self-segregation ... implies an increase in segregation over time" is therefore false, given the definition of self-segregation inferred from his remarks above. I think it is possible nevertheless that Simpson may have thought of 'self-segregation' as essentially equivalent to (that is, defined by) "an increase in segregation over time". From this, it would follow that, if there was no increase in segregation over time, then there would be no self-segregation. This logic is consistent with the exposition given in Simpson (2004). The problem with the logic is evidently that it wrongly assimilates an outcome (an increase in segregation) with one of the processes (self-segregation) that may or may not lead to the outcome.
5. I would include religiously-motivated exclusions as problematic in a variety of contexts, but I do not wish to assimilate this type of exclusion to 'racism' *simpliciter*. For more on this, see the following discussion.
6. The principle of ethnic self-description he commends for statistical work (Simpson, 2004, p. 662) would for example rule out nearly all large surveys, including the name analysis techniques that underlie his work on Bradford. His remark that "average statistics about individuals tend to encourage stereotyping, almost by definition" (Simpson,

2004, p. 663) comes uncomfortably close to the proscription of a standard technique. It is one thing to say that statistical techniques can be used in unhelpful ways—for example, stereotypically. It is quite another to suggest (if Simpson is suggesting this) that a roster of approved anti-racist statistical techniques can be drawn up in advance of the analysis itself and independently of their contexts of use.

7. Simpson (2004, p. 668) concedes that demographic data cannot distinguish between “voluntary and enforced segregation”, but then brushes this objection aside.
  8. The debate was sparked off by Trevor Phillips (2005). Simpson is cited by name in a prominent newspaper response to Phillips by Daniel Dorling (2005) and Lee Jasper (2005) comments in another article that “researchers have found that Britain is becoming less, not more, segregated”, which I take to be a reference to Simpson’s work.
  9. The figures given in this paragraph are calculated from the ED-level raw data. I am especially grateful to Ludi Simpson for supplying these data to me in the knowledge that my interpretation of them differed from his.
  10. Simpson (2004, Table 3) gives a slightly lower figure (25 703) for the net increase of the South Asian population over the decade, but the figures used in his Table 3 run to the year 2000, not 2001.
  11. It is a great weakness in current understandings that there are, so far as I am aware, no academic studies referring to the self-segregation of non-South-Asian populations, including both White and African-Caribbean respondents. This omission means of course that even if it were true (which it is not) that self-segregation is mythical amongst South Asian populations in Bradford, it would not follow that self-segregation is mythical for Bradford as a whole.
  12. For the first type of choice, choosing not to mix with ‘the other kind’ is a logical corollary of choosing to associate with ‘one’s own kind’, however ‘kind’ is defined in any given case.
  13. Phillips still speaks about “the pervasive myth of inner-city segregation” in her most recent paper, and remarks that “our research ... belies the stereotype of an overwhelmingly self-segregating, inward-looking population” (Phillips, 2006, p. 36) who are “choosing to opt out of British society” (p. 34). Yet this surely makes the point. It is perfectly possible to accept that self-segregation exists, without lapsing into the stereotypical perceptions that it is overwhelmingly inward-looking, or that it implies opting out of society.
- The interesting question here for the politics of discourse is why Phillips, and indeed Simpson, are so eager, or perhaps desperate, to cling to the mythical status of self-segregation, despite all the evidence they present that runs counter to their own conclusions.
14. *Chambers* dictionary also defines myth as “an ancient traditional story of gods or heroes, esp. one offering an explanation of some fact or phenomenon”. According to this alternative usage, a claim that some phenomenon P is mythical calls for evidence that it occurs in a traditional story, rather than evidence for or against its real existence. In such a context, the truth value of belief in P becomes a side issue, and most traditional stories will no doubt contain a mixture of true and false statements regarding P. It seems clear, however, that Simpson is not using the term ‘myth’ in this sense, because of the explicit contrast he introduces between a ‘statistical myth’, on the one hand, and the myth-buster’s “confidence about what represents truth” on the other (Simpson, 2005b, p. 15). This aligns Simpson’s usage with the dictionary definitions given in the main text above—he is not claiming that references to residential statistics for Bradford may be found in Homer.
  15. Strictly speaking, the level and direction of change are not independent of each other if the levels are at either a maximum or minimum value.
- To see how ethnic self-segregation can move independently of ethnic segregation, consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that patterns of segregation are caused by a combination of: the availability of financial resources for movement to the suburbs (‘middle-class flight’); and, ethnic self-segregation (including ‘White flight’).

Next suppose that South Asian inner-city residents improve their economic situation much more than White inner-city residents, whilst Whites become slightly more inclined to move away from the inner city for ethnic reasons. Then segregation may decrease and self-segregation may increase simultaneously. The converse set of assumptions may lead to an opposite pair of movements. Hence segregation and self-segregation are logically independent phenomena. Myth-claims 3 and 4 are therefore logically independent of Myth-claims 1 and 2.

16. It is possible that whenever Simpson writes about 'self-segregation' without qualification in his 2004 paper he always intended 'residential self-segregation', which is the main topic of his paper. In that case, he is not asserting Myth-claim 1 in its literal sense, but only in the sense of Myth-claim 2. If Myth-claim 1 turns out to be false, it might then seem unfair to tax him with asserting a false claim which he never meant to assert in the first place. On the other hand, the 'legend of self-segregation' is traced by Simpson (2004, p. 677) to its source in the Ouseley Report, which was concerned with patterns of social life in general, not just residential self-segregation. And there is no doubt that Simpson intends his myth-busting activity to challenge the whole approach adopted by Ouseley, not just one facet of it. On balance, therefore, it seems fair to attribute Myth-claim 1 to Simpson in its literal sense. And it is in any case important for the purposes of clarity to keep the distinction between the two claims in mind.
17. Since Myth-claim 1 implies Myth-claim 2, the negation of Myth-claim 2 implies the negation of Myth-claim 1.
18. Enumeration districts contained a mean population of 518 in 2001. There are 30 electoral wards in the Bradford District, each of which includes about 31 EDs, which yielded an average ward population of 16 026 in 2001.
19. "Finally, if we take the most segregated groups in either country, Asians in Britain and Blacks in America, and compare them, then Bradford with its Pakistani population and Leicester with its Indian population are up there in the top fifty list ... Hence, they were already in 2001 at the international scale in terms of segregation, a level which increased markedly between 1991 and 2001" (Poulsen, 2005, p. 7).
20. And Simpson could not have it both ways. In his 2004 paper, he used the (lack of increase in) the Dissimilarity Index as sufficient to establish Myth-claim 4—the *absence of change* in segregation over the 1990s. Yet, in that case, the (high) value of the dissimilarity index must also be sufficient to establish the *high level* of segregation throughout the same period and thus the falsehood of Myth-claim 3.
21. This symmetry property follows immediately by inspection of the symmetrical construction of the index, including its use of absolute differences (see Appendix 1).
22. A 'non-uniform pattern' in this context is a pattern of migration and/or natural increase which varies across different geographical parts of Bradford *for the same ethnic group*.
23. Data are not available to the author that would discriminate between residential relocation and differential migration, birth or death as causes of the observed differences. However, the latter would have to exist on an extraordinary scale to be responsible for the differences. Could a *differential* birth rate between the South Asian populations of, say, University ward and the adjacent Toller ward account for a population difference of almost 5000—that is, up to a third of the total populations of the respective wards—over the course of a single decade? Or why would migration patterns be so sharply differentiated for populations of similar ethnicity in two places next door to each other?
24. Poulsen (2005) describes a very similar model as the 'American assimilation model'.
25. Clayton and (at a pinch) Toller wards might just qualify as 'inner suburbs', but Bradford Moor does not.
26. Given that these movements should in principle affect the Dissimilarity Index, its constant value remains puzzling. The answer to the puzzle turns out to be quite subtle. The calculation of the ward index is dominated by the contributions of three wards: University, Toller and Bradford Moor. These are the data points at which the profiles of the ethnic

groups are most dissimilar. During the 1990s, the (relative) loss of South Asian population made University ward *more* like the rest of Bradford, whereas the combined (relative) gains of South Asian population and (relative) losses of White population made Toller and Bradford Moor *less* like the rest of Bradford. Inspection of the data reveals that these two effects cancelled out almost exactly, so that the value of the index remained unchanged. Simpson (2004, p. 674) noted correctly that “the index of segregation for Bradford as a whole has been stable, but this stability is the balance between several different trends”. He did not, however, specify that the counterbalancing trends involve variations from constant growth paths, which suggest in turn that relocation within the District is ethnically differentiated and probably therefore ‘self-segregating’. It may be that Simpson was led to infer from the constancy of the Dissimilarity Index that segregation was not increasing and then to infer (wrongly) from this that self-segregation did not exist (see the discussion in note 4). In fact, a close analysis of the reasons for the constancy of the index provides further evidence for the existence of self-segregation.

27. I am indebted to an *Urban Studies* referee who brought home to me the significance of this point for the argument of this paper. A proof of the proposition is given in Appendix 1.
28. The Isolation Index for South Asians in 2001 cannot fall below 0.2, for example, which is the value it would attain if the South Asian population was uniformly distributed, comprising exactly 20 per cent of the population of each ED (or ward).
29. It would follow from the data, for example, that whilst South Asians became more isolated from Whites in Bradford during the 1990s, Whites became less isolated from South Asians.
30. The mathematical details of the various indices are given in Appendix 1. In view of the problems identified in the text, it would be advantageous to rename the Isolation Index as, say, the ‘Local Density Index’, with the Corrected Isolation Index becoming, say, the ‘Relative Local Density Index’, defined in each case for populations of a given ethnicity.

There is evidently a trade-off for segregation indices between formal propriety and intuitive suggestiveness: the Dissimilarity Index and the Separation Index are stronger on the former; the Density Indices are stronger on the latter.

31. Burgess and Wilson (2003) confirm that, in addition to the high levels of residential segregation, Bradford is one of the five local education authorities nationally with extreme ethnic segregation in schools. The others are Oldham, Blackburn, Birmingham and Luton. A later study from the same team concludes that

The graphs [for Bradford] do seem to reflect higher segregation in schools than in wards—there are more wards that might be described as mixed than there are schools (Burgess *et al.*, 2005, p. 1050).

Because this study relies on aggregate statistical data, it covers issues of segregation only, not self-segregation. The fact that schools are *more* segregated in ethnic terms than neighbourhoods provides nevertheless a strong indication that self-segregation is partly responsible for the outcome, because it is difficult to see what factors could be responsible for the outcome other than self-conscious selection with an ethnic component. In particular, the fact that parents are drawn from the same neighbourhoods would tend to act as a statistical control for factors such as income, class and even education that might otherwise affect decisions about school choice.

32. Education Bradford is the private company, owned by the defence contractor Serco, which is responsible for supporting and developing schools within the Bradford District.
33. As Phillips observes: “to equate greater physical mixing, through desegregation, with enhanced social integration and understanding would be unwise” (Phillips, 2006, p. 31).
34. Alam and Husband (2006, p. 54) attribute the change to the external influence of Islamophobia on the consciousness of their male British-Pakistani subjects. This is surely one factor, but I suspect that the full causal picture is more complicated than they allow.

35. This will imply of course that all the indices of segregation take on values that are not significantly different (statistically) from their minimum possible values.
36. Urban geographers appear sometimes to *measure* key concepts in purely statistical terms and yet *interpret* the measures for the quality of intracommunal relationships that they allegedly imply, without further appeal to evidence that actually bears on the latter issue. Thus Johnston *et al.* (2002, pp. 211–212) develop a model derived from Boal, which creates a (statistical) scale of segregation running from low-level ‘assimilation’, through medium-level ‘pluralism’ and ‘segmentation’, to high-level ‘polarisation’. The problem is that, since any given level of (statistical) segregation is at most necessary, but not sufficient, for some degree of (cultural or political) polarisation, the same level of segregation is likely to be compatible with different degrees of polarisation in different cases, depending on the political and cultural dynamics of the different situations. Trying to establish threshold values of segregation at which ‘segmentation’, for example, turns into ‘polarisation’ is thus a misguided exercise—it is an attempt to squeeze out of the statistical distributions more juice than they contain.
37. The terminology of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ is used here in the first instance in its arithmetical sense. The circumstances in which the terms might also be used in their political sense—that is, denoting power relations as well as arithmetic proportions—is a nice question, about which no more will be said in this paper (for some further discussion bearing on the topic, however, see Carling *et al.*, 2004, p. 46).
38. “I accept the conclusions of these findings—that projections *can* usefully be undertaken” (Len Cook, National Statistician; in Haskey, 2002, p. iv; original emphasis).
39. A more recent publication (Serco, 2005) gives a figure of 32 per cent.
40. This percentage has remained stable at between 25 per cent and 27 per cent in all the years between 1998 and 2004 inclusive, according to ONS reports. It is likely that the majority of these cases consist of Muslim women born in Pakistan (or Bangladesh)

who have married men resident in Bradford. Yet this does not exhaust the effects of transcontinental marriage, since it does not cover the converse set of circumstances: births to women born in the UK whose husbands were born in Pakistan (or Bangladesh). Singh has argued that

There are two predictable consequences of these [‘international’] marriages: (a) within the Muslim community the home culture and home language is likely to remain other than English requiring language support for the children and thus slowing down the whole process of their adjustment in the wider society. (b) It increases the likelihood of the continuation of many more ‘unstable and unhappy’ marriages (Singh, 2002, p. 167).

The enhanced genetic burden carried by first-cousin marriages is also a matter of concern. It is not known (so far as I am aware) whether the practice of transcontinental marriage makes marriages between close relatives more frequent or less frequent.

41. Simpson (2005a, p. 1230) comes close to suggesting that the political context of discussion of relative numbers is so fraught that such discussion should not be attempted. This seems to me a counsel of despair.
42. It is a possible inference from his description of the model, and an associated remark about the precursor experience of “the Jewish and Irish immigration [to Bradford] a century ago” (2005a, p. 1229), that Simpson expects there to be a process of ‘natural’ acculturation in which the distinctiveness of the immigrant groups would recede over time. I am informed (in a personal communication) that this is not his expectation for the future.
43. An important question for comparative research is the difference created in Bradford in this respect from those other centres of the ‘northern riots’ of 2001, Oldham and Burnley, which have smaller populations. Poulsen has also said that

It would appear [from “research across the nations”] that the larger the ethnic group the more likely they are to seek to form their own communities, and the larger those communities the more likely they are

to resist the process of spatial assimilation (Poulsen, 2005, p. 6).

This finding runs counter to the assumption implicit in the 'basic shape' model of migration and dispersal.

44. The differences in ground rules relate to such matters as the ultimate reference or non-reference of social issues to arbitration by holy texts, the conventions of gender segregation, the nature of the dividing line between public and private interests and concerns and dietary conventions.

There may also be institutions, or parts of them, that straddle the boundaries between these two institutional orders in Bradford. Some of the ward branches of each of the mainstream political parties are cases in point. Whether these mixed institutions evolve towards accommodation or towards polarisation is an important issue for the future (Lewis, 2002, p. 220; Schofield, 2006).

45. This makes the Muslim population somewhat like 'global nomads' in their ability to move between jurisdictions, but this happens mainly between just two jurisdictions (the UK and Pakistan) rather than on a multilateral scale, and in collective networks, whereas "as individuals they are more like vulnerable migrants in their relative poverty and stigmatisation" (Carling, 2006, p. 15).
46. This is further complicated by the fact that young people from all backgrounds are also exposed to common cultures of, for example, Western consumerism, although this may of course be received and filtered in different ways by young people with different backgrounds.
47. Another possibility is that minority ethnic young people may fall between two stools, into the alienated space that exists in the gaps between these two sets of institutions, through criminal activity or gang membership, say, for young men. This was the burden of Graham Mahoney's submission to the Ouseley Report (2001), based on his long experience of working in race relations in Bradford (and see also Bolognani, 2005). For young women, this possibility is perhaps more likely to translate into psychological stress and mental health issues, through an internalisation of anger

and aggression, for example, which cannot be outwardly expressed.

48. Johnston *et al.* concluded in similar vein that

London is not a fragmented city. There are areas—not all of them inner-city—whose populations have larger components from one or more of the minority ethnic groups than those groups contribute to the total population, but relatively few of those areas are dominated by one such group (Johnston *et al.*, 2002, p. 231).

They add immediately, however, that

Most white Londoners live in exclusive areas, where they are unlikely to have contact with members of the ethnic minorities, either formally or informally.

The similarity between London and Bradford thus seems to be the existence of (statistical) segregation between White and BME populations; the difference is that the BME populations tend to be mixed *amongst themselves* in London, whereas in Bradford they are not, because of the numerical preponderance in Bradford of the Pakistani-British grouping.

An interesting insight into the comparative quality of social relationships in the two places is also provided by Alyas Karmani

I came from a very diverse part of South London where there was a lot of integration between different communities, and there was a lot of *interaction* between the different communities. It was very comfortable for me to flit between white groups and black groups—groups of white people and Asian people were very comfortable in terms of interacting with one another. When I came to Bradford, the first thing I found was that there wasn't that informal interaction taking place between different communities, and the communities seemed to be very separated (Fitch, 2005, p. 6).

49. David Allport, who has worked for the anti-racist organisation Rewind in Bradford, has said memorably of this situation

Even if you don't call it racism, and you call it prejudice or bigotry, or discrimination—whatever semantics you want to use—it's

wrong, and that person is going through some pretty nasty stuff, whoever they are (Fitch, 2005, p. 4).

50. Voting returns are taken from City of Bradford (2004). It is not possible to compute the exact number of people who voted for BNP candidates because of the possibility of multiple voting in the multimember ward elections of 2004. The far-right vote count might have been even higher, but for the courageous action of the then-BNP organiser in Bradford, Andrew Sykes, who saw through the façade of the party and began to work against it from inside (Bradford *Telegraph and Argus*, 27 August 2004). He is believed to have been responsible for the fact that the number of BNP candidates was restricted to 10.
  51. Bradford South recorded almost 8 per cent; Dewsbury recorded the highest vote share in the region, just over 13 per cent.
  52. The 2007 results indicate that BNP support was more heavily concentrated in fewer wards than in the previous year, and fell away in other areas, so that the BNP was the second party in only five wards.
  53. See the eponymous *539 Voters' Views* (Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2004) for one recent study that contains some information about a small number of BNP voters (69 in total) from Calderdale and East Lancashire, although not in Bradford. The geographical clustering of the wards where the BNP candidates were elected, on the southern and western borders of the District, suggests that there is a 'Pennine' dimension to its influence, in parts of the District that have looked historically towards Halifax or Lancashire as well as towards Bradford.
- Although social deprivation is almost certainly involved in patterns of support for the BNP, the effects are by no means straightforward. There is far-right support in some relatively affluent wards such as Worth Valley, which is also one of the areas where the White population grew most in the 1990s. The BNP has failed on the other hand to make much headway in some other areas, whose almost exclusively White populations suffer high levels of deprivation.
54. There are of course important differences between them, not least the content of the

authoritarian regimes they would wish to install: a xenophobic nationalist regime on the one hand, a theocratic Caliphate (the Khilafah State) on the other hand.

And there are differences too in their approach to contemporary British politics. The BNP has adopted a parliamentary strategy, which has sought to disguise its antecedents and to modify its message for public consumption. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects democratic participation, as part-and-parcel of its rejection of human rights and all the other paraphernalia of Western immorality (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2000, pp. 38–39): one of its publications is entitled *Democracy is a System of Kufr: It is Forbidden to Adopt, Implement or Call for it* (1995). The group did, however, tour the streets with a loudspeaker van during the last general election campaign, urging Muslims not to vote. This might be seen as a rather British form of anti-participatory participation.

It is tempting to regard Hizb ut-Tahrir as a fascist organisation, but I have resisted this temptation on the grounds that the term 'fascist' should be reserved for groups with historical antecedents in the European fascist movements. Yet this does not mean that Hizb ut-Tahrir is an entirely 'non-Western' phenomenon. It may have inherited its anti-capitalism and part of its vanguard conception of politics from the Leninist or Trotskyist currents within Marxism. If this is so, it would serve to make the point that cultural borrowings are not always advantageous: Hizb ut-Tahrir may well combine all the worst elements of both the Islamic and the Marxist traditions.

55. I invite any reader who is inclined to dispute this judgment, or to dismiss the characterisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir given earlier, to read for themselves the publications given in the references. This literature has been collected by the author at public events in the Bradford District over the past few years and there is no doubt that Hizb ut-Tahrir is active there, although it is difficult to determinate how influential it is amongst young Muslims.

The important point for the current argument is that, if (or in so far as) young Muslims are looking for support for an attitude of

hostility towards the West and everything it stands for, up to and including legitimisation for acts of violent retaliation, then this support is readily available from the literature of Hizb ut-Tahrir, amongst other sources.

56. The issue has been raised in Bradford debates whether continuity exists between these episodes, including the Manningham disturbances of 1995 and 2001, such as would constitute evidence of an underlying culture of political violence, or whether each incident in the sequence is to be understood as a singular occurrence with its own specific causes. I will not pursue this issue further here.
57. It is a significant research issue to what extent the narrative of 'community defence' that has become prominent in connection with the 2001 disturbances partakes of territorialism in this sense.
58. Such a scheme of challenge (or provocation) and response could be used to understand the sequence of events before, during and after the 2001 disturbances, but I will not pursue the analysis further here.
59. It may be, for example, that a rumour develops to the effect that a particular neighbourhood (or a particular school) is about to become, say, 'Asian', or perhaps 'Muslim'. Because non-Asians (or non-Muslims) may not wish to be part of a very small minority in such a neighbourhood or school, they may all avoid it, with the consequence that it does indeed become all-Asian (or all-Muslim) very quickly. The rumour can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, in other words, where the choice situation is fluid.
60. "Perceiving and presenting the issues in 'Muslim' terms has seriously alienated the Indian, African and Caribbean communities from race related issues. These communities feel marginalised in the city and seem to have effectively disengaged from the majority of local initiatives" (Singh, 2002, p. 173).
61. To cite one example: the authors make the interesting observation about their respondents that "*the loosening of family authority and the progressive disengagement from 'homeland' obligations and cultures is creating a British space in which a wide variety of personal engagements with Islam are thriving*" (p. 54; original emphasis). This, however, leaves open the key questions facing both the Muslims and the non-Muslims who live alongside the respondents: what kinds of personal engagement with Islam are going to flourish? Will these prove conducive to mutual accommodation and positive citizenship, or will they not?
62. A partial list of the official initiatives in this field organised directly by the Council and/or its Local Strategic Partner (Bradford Vision) includes the Bradford and Keighley Youth Parliament (*BXp4*, 2005—see Appendix 2 for details), the Diversity Exchange, the Community Accord mediation service and the Linking Communities initiative. Religious organisations have created the Faiths Forum (*BXp1*, 2004) and other bridge-building initiatives (*BXp9*, 2005). Keighley Together is a joint initiative of religious organisations and the reputable political parties formed specifically to counter the far-right threat in that part of the District (*BXp8*, 2005). The Intercultural Leadership School has been established to encourage the development of a new generation of leaders (Lewis, forthcoming). The Linking Schools programme, designed to overcome some of the effects of educational segregation, has been expanding rapidly under the aegis of Education Bradford (*BXp2*, 2005). A wide variety of institutions in the District, including the West Yorkshire Police

The sadness of such an outcome is of course that many people who act on the rumour might be perfectly happy to accept a more mixed (and potentially accommodating) outcome, so long as they could be reassured that the mixed outcome would remain stable over time. This argument raises issues about the effects of choice in public service provision that go well beyond the concerns of the current paper. In most places in the UK, for example, the primary concern will be about segregation along social class lines, refracted through issues of selection by performance in the case of education. The point for the present discussion is that the dynamics of choice

Service, the Health Authorities, the Council for Mosques (*BXp10*, 2005), the University of Bradford and Bradford City Football Club, have also been involved in numerous projects favouring cohesion, alongside similar initiatives from the business sector (Darlow *et al.*, 2005, pp. 42–47).

63. See especially Varshney (2002), who confirms the importance of civic engagement in leading to an accommodation between ethnic groups, even in urban situations (from the Indian sub-continent) with histories of endemic violence many times more serious and prolonged than anything seen in Bradford.
64. The *Bradford Experience* radio series (see Appendix 2) involved more than 70 interviews in total, with a range of local (and a few national) figures.

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## Appendix 1. Mathematical Note on Segregation Indices

Assume that a population containing two ethnic groups  $X$  and  $Y$  is distributed among  $n$  distinct locations, where a location might be a residential area, a school, etc. Let the population of the two groups at the  $i$ th location be  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  respectively ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ). Define  $X = \sum x_i$  and  $Y = \sum y_i$  as the total populations of the two groups, where the summation occurs (in this and every other case below) over every location ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ).

### 1. The Dissimilarity Index

The Dissimilarity Index for the two groups is then given by

$$D = \sum |x_i/X - y_i/Y| \tag{1}$$

where, the operation  $||$  yields the absolute value of the term to which it applies. (The absolute value is the numerical value of the term regardless of its (positive or negative) sign.)

The dissimilarity index is defined on the unit interval:  $D \in [0, 1]$ .

The index is symmetrical, as can be seen by transposition of terms in equation (1), which leaves the value of  $D$  unaltered.

Suppose next that the populations of the two groups vary by constant factors  $a$  and  $b$  respectively at each location. The total populations  $X$  and  $Y$  will evidently change by the same factors.

The new value of the dissimilarity index is calculated as

$$D' = \sum |ax_i/aX - by_i/bY| \tag{2}$$

$$= \sum |x_i/X - y_i/Y| = D$$

This shows that the index is invariant to constant proportional growth (or shrinkage) of one or both of the two groups.

### 2. The Isolation Index

The Isolation Index for group  $X$  is given by

$$I_X = \sum (x_i/X) * x_i/(x_i | y_i) \tag{3}$$

with a cognate expression for the Isolation Index of group  $Y$ :  $I_Y$ .

$I_X$  is defined on the interval  $[X/(X + Y), 1]$

The Isolation Index is not symmetrical, since in general  $I_X \neq I_Y$ .

The term  $x_i/(x_i + y_i)$  in the summation gives the proportion of group  $X$  in the total population at location  $i$ . The term  $x_i/X$  weights this proportion according to the number of individuals from the group who experience it. The Isolation Index thus expresses the average (mean) experience of the individuals in group  $X$ , in terms of the proportion between the groups at each individual’s location.

### 3. The Corrected Isolation Index

The Corrected Isolation Index for group  $X$  is given by

$$CI_X = I_X - X/(X + Y) \tag{4}$$

with a cognate expression for the corrected isolation index of group  $Y$ :  $CI_Y$ .

$CI_X$  is defined on the interval  $[0, Y/(X + Y)]$ .

Again, the Corrected Isolation Index is not symmetrical, since in general  $CI_X \neq CI_Y$ .

### 4. The Separation Index

The Separation Index for group  $X$  is given by

$$S_X = CI_X * (X + Y)/Y \tag{5}$$

with a cognate expression for the Separation Index of group  $Y$ :  $S_Y$ .

The Separation Index is defined on the unit interval:  $S_X, S_Y \in [0, 1]$ .

## 5. Symmetry of the Separation Index

To test for symmetry, set

$$S_X = I_X * (X + Y) / Y - X / Y \quad (6)$$

$$= [\{\sum(x_i/X) * x_i / (x_i + y_i)\} * (X + Y) / Y - X / Y] \quad (7)$$

$$= 1 / XY \{[\sum(x_i^2 / (x_i + y_i) * (X + Y)) - X^2] \quad (8)$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} XY * [S_X - S_Y] &= [\sum(x_i^2 - y_i^2) / (x_i + y_i) * (X + Y)] - [X^2 - Y^2] \\ &= [\sum(x_i - y_i) * (X + Y)] - (X^2 - Y^2) \\ &= (X - Y) * (X + Y) - (X^2 - Y^2) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Thus  $S_X \equiv S_Y$  and the Separation Index is symmetrical.

Note that equations (4), (5) and (6) establish linear relationships between  $I_X$ ,  $CI_X$  and  $S_X$  for given total populations  $X$  and  $Y$  of the respective groups.

## Appendix 2. Radio Broadcasts

The *Bradford Experience* series was broadcast originally on BCB 96.7fm, now BCB 106.6fm. Details are as follows.

*BXp1:* Faiths Forum Launch, first broadcast on 1 December 2004

*BXp2:* Queen's Message/ Multicultural Education, 23 January 2005.

*BXp4:* Bradford and Keighley Youth Parliament, 20 February 2005.

*BXp7:* Keighley Part 1: Local Issues and Concerns, 3 April 2005.

*BXp8:* Keighley Part 2: Initiatives and Solutions, 17 April 2005.

*BXp9:* Mythbusters (Scargill Centre), 1 May 2005.

*BXp10:* Khidmat Centre, 29 May 2005.

*BXp12:* Dealing with Racism in the Bradford District, 26 June 2005.

*BXp13:* Cohesion Policy in Bradford, 10 July 2005.